The following essay is an examination of how the theory of one area of social problem solving, is similar to and can inform another.

There are elements in common between those who look after our health and those who try to keep crime off the streets. These are the four strategic similarities;

Problems can be prevented

Problems can be analysed

Causes can be detected

Causes can be treated

Corona virus is not new. SARS and then MARS are two recent examples, but throughout history humans have been literally, plagued by them. Each time they come and go, there are lessons to learn. These will help preparation for the next.

This may involve warehousing hospital supplies for instance. The span of time between outbreaks will help to inform the ‘use by’ dates on perishable items. Typical examples would be testing kits, ventilators, hand sanitiser, personal protective equipment, software and even signage.

South Korea has performed particularly well in dealing with the current corona virus pandemic. It puts this down to four key strategies, which are the same as those above;

Prepare

Test

Trace

Isolate

Having the means to deal with the next outbreak at the very earliest opportunity is essential. Countries that have experienced denial of a problem by it’s leaders, or have lacked equipment or funding (e.g.. for research ) are going to lose more citizens than those countries which have prepared.

The old adage ‘a stitch in time saves nine (stitches)‘ is wisdom from the past that we ignore at our peril.

Any police chief trying to reduce crime will be familiar with the principles of crime prevention. Simple and best value strategies for dealing with say, burglary can save the tax payer vast quantities of money needed to put one burglar behind prison bars. Ten pounds spent on preventing burglaries, might save a one hundred thousand pound court case.

Over the last few decades police have moved from the universal production of posters such as the ‘lock it or lose it!’ campaign and ‘watch out there is a thief about!’ to targeted prevention and detection.

It is clear that sending a crime prevention message that may or may not be highly relevant to a community is wasteful. It also raises an unwarranted anxiety of being a victim of crime within low risk areas of the country.

Instead police started analysing their computers and finding patterns. They were interested in where, when and how a particular crime was occurring – long before they asked the question ‘who was doing it’. This built up intelligence which is invaluable to inform the prevention of crime. For instance, if thieves were breaking into cars in town centre car parks, the analysts identified which car parks were most targeted, which parking spaces were being targeted, what time of day and day of the week etc. This might identify an area in a car park where they was a good escape route and poor lighting, no CCTV coverage and little footfall. All of these could be rectified by car park managers on advice from the police. The public would pay nothing and the car park manager would see a rise in the use of the car park and revenue.

The South Koreans were also good at identifying where corona virus victims were. Instead of fighting what Donald Trump and Boris Johnson called ‘the invisible enemy’, the Koreans analysed information from personal smart phone locations cross referenced to recent entry and exit of foreign countries. With this information they were able to target their testing and identifying ‘hot spots’ where transmission of the virus was likely to happen and or happening. They even used police detectives to trace individuals and their movements.

Police call this ‘detection’. It is the natural follow on from the initial process of finding out as much as possible because the problem is hidden, not invisible.

By targeting resources in this way there are two benefits. The first is that it is cheaper. This may sound callous but in fact cost can be a huge inhibitor to action.

The second advantage of targeting action, is that businesses can carry on, if only in a limited way. One tactic for instance would be for elderly high risk victims to be placed in isolation while low risk younger people to maintain the economy and public services.

Prevention and Detection are really two parts of the same process of ‘reduction’ whether you are considering health or crime. They exist on a spectrum between the two extremes. At each end of the spectrum, detection contains some prevention and prevention contains some detection. As an example, the final result of the criminal justice process is to put an offender in prison. One of the possible outcomes of this is hoped to be preventing that individual ever doing the same thing again. They usually do, but sometimes it works.

picture credit: detroitjournalism.cog

It has been suggested that the present pandemic has been dealt with in a manner in which the cure is worse than the disease. The ‘lock down’ approach to entire populations has ramifications that will lead to huge public debt and austerity.

The question has to be asked, ‘is lock down the only way to deal with the pandemic? The answer is no, because the South Koreans didn’t have to go that far.

Their strategy meant that they did not need to lock down their populations, eliminating in part at least, mental and physical health problems resulting from isolation and economic austerity in the future. Although it was clearly not ‘business as usual’ it was a working compromise between the needs of people to maintain health and an income and the need to eradicate the virus as quickly and with the least cost of money and life.

By targeting their treatments to areas of the population in most need, they have provided a model that the rest of the world would do well to study and copy. Lessons learned should already be being digested and fed into the strategy for Covid 20, which we can expect is already hanging in a cave somewhere in the world.

When the Covid 19 strain was first detected in China the world watched. As a top down organised country China had more tools at it’s disposal than democracy’s, but the principles are the same. What the rest of the world might have also taken seriously is asking the question, ‘are we next?’ Governments might have looked to the World Health Organisation for an answer. For many weeks the WHO did not declare a pandemic was happening. What world leaders needed to know was when it would happen i.e. be proactive not reactive.

In the United Kingdom the medical journal The Lancet included an article on how the outbreak in China will become a pandemic. This was in January 2020. In February the country had a chance to prepare. It did not. At the end of March personal protective equipment, ventilators and testing kits are still being ‘rolled out’ – as the government puts it. New cases are doubling every three to four days. The government of course denies being slow in preparing for the pandemic and points to the fifty new hospitals they have built. But hospitals are for the treatment of victims, not preventing people becoming victims. The resources are sent to the results of a pandemic not preventing one.

The vital point here is ‘timing’. There are three possible outcomes from deciding when to take action.

The first is that measures are put in place too early. Ministers in the UK expressed concern that fatigue sets into the population if protective measures are introduced too early. They wanted to time maximum protective measures with maximum victims. There was an assumption that the patience of people to avoid their death or of loved ones, is limited. It could be argued that as more fatalities occur the more concentrated minds become.

The second possibility is that exactly the right moment is chosen. This is ideal but is best judged in retrospect, ‘wise after the event’.

The third possibility is that measures are put in place too late. In this case there will be the highest number of human deaths and the most expenditure of money.

Of these, the first two are proactive and in my view produce the best results.

Reacting to problems is to undertake stitching nine stitches instead of one.

Getting the warnings right, is where you might expect the World Health Organisation is the expert. Viruses are not new and statisticians and virologists can get together and draw up predictive curves. They should be good at this even if each country is different.

The tragedy is that politicians are self selected for their political ideals and personal appeal. They may not have the abilities to assess a situation and give precise direction at the appropriate time. They may not listen to their advisors and or may just use the advice to avert personal responsibility.

These principles of proactive and reactive management and decision making are as true for dealing with crime as for health. They are so universal that they can even be applied to playing a game of football, which is why clubs employ statisticians to analyse games in minute detail, as they progress and after.

There is nothing in life for which we are not equipped. The only real challenge is overcoming our own shortcomings.